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PRATT AND DEDUCTIONS FOR
PAYMENTS TO PARTNERS
BY DONALD

J.

WEIDNER*

Tallahassee, Florida

I. INTRODUCTION
When does a deduction result from a compensation or interest payment a partnership makes to one of its members? Controversy and confusion concerning this fundamental question have existed throughout the
history of our income tax. Prior to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,'
neither salaries paid to partners nor interest paid them on their capital contributions were deductible in the computation of partnership taxable income or loss. In certain situations, however, partners were permitted to
directly deduct portions of payments made to fellow partners. A major
change was made by section 707 of the 1954 Code, which specifically authorizes partnership deductions for certain types of payments to partners.
Until quite recently, there had been remarkably little judicial or administrative authority interpreting the provision, which has come to be relied
upon quite extensively. Real estate partnerships, for example, frequently
allocate promoters a percentage of gross receipts for their managerial abilities, and interest on any sums they loan to the partnership. Although the
Tax Reform Act of 19762 contained numerous changes to and clarifications
of the partnership provisions of subchapter K, it dealt with only one small
facet of the member payment issue. It failed to clarify the basic principles
that determine when deductions may be claimed for payments to partners.
Within a relatively few months after the passage of the 1976 Act, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the Tax Court's decision in
Edward T. Pratt,3 which interpreted and applied sections 707(a) and 707(c).
The purpose of this paper is to explore the reasoning and aftermath of
Pratt,which is an extremely significant decision in the long and troubled
history of the treatment of payments to partners.
II. PRE-1954 CODE DEVELOPMENTS
The law of partnerships has long been characterized by efforts to identify those issues that will be resolved in accord with the entity theory of
partnerships and those that will be resolved in accord with an aggregate
*Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law. B.S., Fordham University,
1966; J.D., University of Texas at Austin, 1969. Professor Weidner is a member of the Real
Property Section Committee on Federal Tax Aspects of Real Estate Transactions; however,
the views expressed herein do not necessarily represent the views of the Committee or of any
other of its members.
The author would like to express his appreciation to Professor Joseph W.Jacobs and Mr.
David B. Mursten, both of Florida State University Law School, for their assistance in the
preparation of this article.
'I NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, as amended [hereinafter "COD" or "1954 CODE"].
'The Tax Reform Act of 1976, H.R. 10613, Pub. L. No. 94-455 [hereinafter "1976 Act"].
364 T.C. 203 (1975), affd in part,rev'd in part, 550 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1977).
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theory of partnerships. The dichotomy existed under state law long before
there were any questions of federal income taxation of partners and partnerships. Traditionally, the common law aggregate approach declined to
recognize the partnership as a separate legal personality. The aggregate
approach viewed the partnership as nothing more than a conduit for the
collection of individuals it embraced. Opposed to the aggregate approach
was the entity theory, which viewed the partnership as an independent legal personality. As the state law of partnership developed, the adoption of
the entity approach was urged on the ground that it was a feature of the
law merchant that reflected business reality more accurately than the aggregate or conduit theory. Ready acceptance of the entity theory was probably impeded by two nineteenth century common law preconceptions. The
first was the notion that the separate legal personality of a business organization is associated with relieving its owners from personal liability. The
second was the related notion that organizational personality was a special
something to be dispensed only by the legislature. Neither of these notions
transferred readily to the relations of partners, who were unlimitedly liable
and whose relation as such could be judicially established independent of
their intent. Tension between the two theories continues under state law in
part because the Uniform Partnership Act is a product of men who espoused opposing theories. Although the Uniform Act does not expressly
4
adopt the entity theory, entity notions permeate.
Tension between the two approaches exists in federal income tax law
even though none of our general revenue codes has ever taxed partnerships as entities. 5 A certain amount of schizophrenia is unavoidable as the
law now stands. Although the partnership is not a separate tax-paying entity, 6 it is a separate entity for the purposes of computing, reporting, and allocating the economic and tax consequences of partnership activities. The
partnership has its own taxable year 7 and it, rather than the individual
partners, makes the basic decisions with respect to the computation of partnership income. 8 It determines, for example, the method of computing
depreciation of partnership property, 9 whether to use a cash or accrual
4

SeeJ. CRANE AND A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 16-29 (1968).
The War Revenue Act of 1917 is a notable supplement to the basic revenue code because
it imposed an income tax on partnerships as entities. War Revenue Act of 1917, § 201,40 Stat.
300, 313, 65th Cong., Sess. I, Ch. 63 (1917):
Sec. 201. That in addition to the taxes under existing law and under this act there shall
be levied, assessed, collected, and paid for each taxable year upon the income of any corporation, partnership, or individual, a tax . . equal to the following percentages of net
income ....
The tax was based on the ratio of "net income" to "invested capital for the taxable year," and
was supplemental to taxes imposed by the Revenue Act of 1916, which provided, in part, as
follows:
(e) Persons carrying on business in partnership shall be liable for income tax only in
their individual capacity, and the share of the profits of the partnership to which any taxable partner would be entitled if the same were divided, whether divided or otherwise,
shall be returned for taxation and the tax paid under the provisions of this title.
Revenue
Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 756, 762, Pub. L. No. 271, 64th Cong., Sess. 1, Ch. 463 (1916).
6
CODE § 701.
7
CODE § 706.
"CODE § 703(b).
9
CODE § 167.
5
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method of accounting, 10 and whether to elect to report income under the
installment method.'I
Prior to the 1954 Code it was clear that salaries paid to partners could
not be deducted in the computation of partnership taxable income or
loss.'2 This conclusion was explained in terms of the aggregate theory of
partnerships. A man working for a partnership was not viewed as working
for a separate entity, he was viewed as working for a collection of individuals. He who worked for his own partnership, therefore, was viewed as partly self-employed and partly working for his fellow partners. It was said that
a man may not, in contemplation of law, pay a salary to himself, either directly or through a partnership. No matter how labeled, the theory went, a
partner's "salary, so-called," was merely a share of partnership profits. Interest payments to partners received the same treatment.' 3 This approach
generated controversy over the appropriate tax treatment of payments that
could not be said to consist entirely of partnership profits because they exceeded partnership profits. In short, it was rationalized that the only possible source of payments in excess of profits was partnership capital. An aggregate theory of partnerships was applied to allow each partner to deduct
the amount by which his capital had been depleted by salary and interest
payments to his fellow partners. To the chagrin of the Service, this approach enabled some partners to treat portions of their salaries as nontaxable returns of their own capital. To the chagrin of all concerned, the
computations associated with this approach were exceedingly complicated.
Augustine M. Lloyd' 4 is generally considered the classic pre-1954 Code
case on the treatment of payments to partners. Lloyd involved an attempt by
the Service to tax the three managing partners of a six-person partnership
on the entire amount of "salary" payments they received. Although the
partnership reported a taxable income of only $8,751, which the Board
also referred to as its "net income" and "earnings," the managing partners'
salaries totaled $21,600. The partnership agreement authorized the three
to "pay to themselves such salary as they may deem reasonable," and further provided that the salaries were operating expenses that were not to be
charged against their interest in partnership assets or profits. In addition to
the salary, each of the three shared in partnership book income or loss,
computed by subtracting the salary payments, in accordance with his contribution to partnership capital. The partnership internally computed a
$12,848 book loss for the year in question.
The Board held that the partners did not have to pay tax on the entire
amount of their salaries because it was "evident" that the salary each received was "not the measure of his gain."' 5 It felt that no partner should be
'°CODE

§§ 446(c) and 703(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.703-1(b) (1974).

"CODE

§ 453.

2S. U. Tilton, 8 B.T.A. 914 (1927), acq., VI1-1 CUM. BULL. 31 (1928).
3

' John A. L. Blake, 9 B.T.A. 651 (1927), acq., VI I-2 CuM. BULL. 3 (1928).
1415 B.T.A. 82 (1929), acq., VII-I CUM. BULL. 27 (1929).
15
1d. at 85.
There was but one source from which the payments made to the petitioners as salaries, in
excess of the partnership earnings, could be made, and that was the capital contributions
of the partners. So the gain of each of the petitioners could not be greater than the excess
of the amount which he received over and above his proportionate share of the partnership loss.
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taxed on any amount greater than his "net gain," which it deemed to be his
salary reduced by his prorata share of the partnership's book loss, which it
referred to as "loss of capital." It then addressed the problem
of determining how . . . the income and loss of each petitioner is to be acwill be required to pay tax on any greater
counted for so that no one of them
6
amount than. . . his net gain.'
To emphasize, the Board did not allocate among the partners the results of
a computation it made at the partnership level. Rather, it computed the
taxable income or loss of each partner as follows. First, each salary constituted taxable income to the extent it represented the recipient's share of
the taxable income reported by the partnership. Proceeding from the fact
that the combined salaries exceeded partnership taxable income, the Board
allocated the entire partnership taxable income among the three salaried
partners in accordance with their salary-sharing ratios. Second, each salary
also constituted taxable income to the extent it was "paid out of the capital"
of fellow partners. Conversely, no partner's salary constituted taxable income to the extent it was paid out of his own capital. Each recipient's general profit-sharing ratio was used to determine how much of his salary that
was not traceable to partnership taxable income was traceable to the capital
accounts of his fellow partners. Finally, the overall profit-sharing ratio was
used to compute how much "capital depletion" each partner had suffered
as a result of the salary payments made to his fellow partners. The Board
said that each partner could deduct the capital depletion he suffered on
account of the expenses because they were ordinary and necessary. To sum
up in one unavoidably complicated sentence, each partner received taxable
income to the extent his salary represented partnership taxable income, to
the further extent it represented a depletion in the capital of his fellows,
but from which he was permitted to deduct the amount by which his own
capital had been depleted by salaries paid to his fellows.
Lloyd was a boon to both salaried and non-salaried partners. It permitted salaried partners to avoid paying tax on portions of "salaries" that
would have been fully taxable had they come from unrelated parties. They
were permitted to trace their salaries to their source to demonstrate that
they did not consist entirely of taxable income and outlays of fellow partners. It appeared to follow quite logically from Lloyd that, for example, a
partner's "salary, so called" was completely non-taxable if it was traceable
entirely to tax-exempt interest income. 17 Lloyd benefitted all partners because it permitted them to deduct directly portions of salaries that could
not be deducted at the partnership level. It did so by permitting them to
individually expense the amounts by which their capital accounts has been
charged for the salary payments of their fellow partners. Lloyd did not discuss any limit on the ability of partners to claim that charges against their
capital accounts support exclusions from income or direct deductions. Is it
sufficient that capital account has been charged, or must it also be shown
that the charge reflects something in the nature of an out-of-pocket expen"Id. at 86.
"7See P. LrrLE, FEDERAL

INCOME TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS 9,39-42 (1952).
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diture? Such is the stuff of Joe W. Stout,18 decided some thirty years after
Lloyd.
Stout is a pre-1954 Code case that has received only slight attention
even though it substantially restricts Lloyd and is particularly instructive for
real estate partnerships. Stout, as Lloyd, involved an attempt by the Service
to tax the full amount of "salary" partners received from their partnership
for services. It also involved the extent to which partners could directly
deduct portions of salaries paid to fellow partners. In November, 1951, five
individuals formed a partnership to construct rental housing. They agreed
to share "net profits" and "net losses" in accordance with their initial capital
contributions, which aggregated a nominal $2,500. Their partnership
agreement designated three of them "to plan and supervise all construction
work done by the partnership," in exchange for which each was to receive a
salary equal to a fixed percentage of the cost of all construction. The agreement directed that the salaries were to be deducted in the computation of
partnership net profit. It specifically provided that if salaries exceeded net
income computed without regard to the salaries, the excess would constitute a loss to the partnership that would be borne by the partners according
to the ratio of their capital contributions. The partnership borrowed
$1,075,700 from a bank to construct an apartment project, which was completed and fully occupied by the followingJuly. The three salaried partners
were paid $99,349 for managing construction by the close of the partnership's fiscal year on August 31, 1952. The following day, the completed
project was conveyed to a newly organized corporation in exchange for the
stock of that corporation. As part of the exchange, the corporation assumed all partnership liabilities attributable to the project, including the
$1,075,700 bank loan.
Pursuant to the agreement, the salaries were treated as an expense on
the partnership books and a $114,692 loss was computed and charged
among the partners in accordance with the ratio of their capital contributions. For tax purposes, the partnership reported a loss of $15,342. The
partnership return described the salaries as "withdrawals" that resulted in
substantial deficits in the capital accounts of each of the five partners. Each
nonsalaried partner claimed a deduction in the amount of the "distributive
share of net loss of the partnership" charged against his capital account.
Similarly, the managing partners offset their salaries by the amounts their
capital accounts had been charged with book loss.
The Service attempted to distinguish Lloyd rather than challenge it
head-on. First, it argued that the salaries in Stout should not be treated as
distributions of partnership capital and profits because they were not paid
to the partners in their capacity as partners. It stressed that the partners
paid to manage construction in Stout had been paid "to perform a specific,
technical nonrecurring service, and [were] dealing with the partnership as
would a third party." 19 The court rejected this argument on the ground
that the salaries were paid pursuant to the provisions of the partnership
1831 T.C. 1199 (1959), (hereinafter referred to as Stout), af'd in part and rem'd sub nom de
Rogers v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 233 (4th Cir. 1960).
1931 T.C. 1208 (1959).
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agreement and not pursuant to a separate contract for services. Accordingly, the amounts were treated "as distributions pursuant to the partnership
agreement."
Second, the Service attempted to confine Lloyd to situations in which
the charges against capital accounts represent "in fact" depletions of partnership assets. Stout, it asserted, did not involve asset depletion because the
partnership "simply substituted for cash a rental housing project; the 'salaries' were capital expenditures for the buildings. '20 Perhaps because the
absence of capital depletion was urged on the ground that a capital asset
had been created, two independent arguments against deductibility were
slurred together before the Tax Court: (1) the charge against partners'
capital accounts did not represent an actual economic outlay necessary to
support a deduction; and (2) the economic outlay, if any, was capital in
nature.
The Tax Court focused on the absence of an economic outlay and
stressed that the charges against capital accounts did not represent an economic loss to the partners. It distinguished Lloyd on the ground that the
partners there had contributed cash sufficient to meet the salary payments
made in excess of partnership income. Stated differently, it confined Lloyd
to situations in which the charges against capital accounts reflect that payments have actually been made out of cash contributions. The Tax Court
said it was "obvious" that no more than $2,500 of the total salaries paid in
Stout "could have been paid from the contributions of the partners. '21 The
remainder, it said, must have been paid from the proceeds of the construction loan. It held that the total amount a partner "is entitled to exclude
from taxable income, either by return of capital or deduction, cannot be
22
greater than his total contribution ....
The Tax Court was not swayed by the provision in the partnership
agreement that salaries in excess of net income were to be borne by all partners in accordance with their overall sharing ratio.
[AIs we construe the partnership agreement, it merely means that the capital
accounts of the partners were to be charged proportionately and would be in
this way a factor upon a division of profits or assets at some future time. Each
partner's capital account was proportionately charged, resulting in a deficit in
each such account.
It does not appear that any of the partners have paid in
23
more capital.
The partners argued that they had made the equivalent of additional capital contributions by incurring personal liability on the construction loan.
The court said it was "problematical" whether the personal liability would
ever be called on. The partners were on a cash method of accounting, and
the possibility of future resort to their personal liability was not sufficient
"to render the claim of right doctrine inapplicable" to the partners who
received salaries. Nor was it sufficient to entitle any partner to salary payment deductions in excess of his actual cash contribution.
20

d

21
1d.
22

1d. at 1209. CompareTreas. Reg. § 1.752-1 (a) (1960).
-31 T.C. 1209-10 (1959).
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The Tax Court recognized that as it was discarding the Lloyd rationale
for permitting deductions for salary payments it was also discarding the
Lloyd rationale for including salaries in income. Recall that Lloyd said that
partners' salaries are taxable to the extent they constitute partnership taxable income and to the further extent they constitute transfers from the capital of fellow partners. Stout involved no partnership taxable income and a
relatively insignificant amount of contributed capital.
Nevertheless, we think that since the full amount of [salary] was received...
under a claim of right and without restriction as to disposition, that amount,
less the return of capital [limited to actual capital contribution], constitute taxable income to24 [the partner] under the broad provisions of [the predecessor of
section 61 (a)].

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed that the salaries should be taxed
except to the extent they represented a return of actual capital contribution
and also agreed that losses that could be reported from salaries were limited to the amount of cash contributions. It further agreed that liability on
the construction loan was not the equivalent of a cash contribution:
[W]hile the partners may have had a technical liability for the debt, at least until
September 1, 1952, it does not appear that it was ever intended that they
should pay it. The corporation's assumption of the debt on September 1, 1952
suggests that no part of the debt will be paid by the partnership or by the partners as individuals and that was the plan from the outset. If the obligation to
repay the borrowed funds is not, in a practical sense, that of the individual
partners, the proceeds
of the loan need not necessarily be regarded as their
25
contributed capital.

The Fourth Circuit took a somewhat different approach to the "primary contention of the Commissioner

. .

. that the salary disbursements

occasioned no loss." It questioned whether the salaries were a capital expenditure of the partnership:
Such a fee, similarly computed, paid to a builder who was a stranger to the
partnership would have been capitalized on the partnership's books and would
have increased by that amount the book value of the project.
The usual rule applicable to salaries for income-producing services may very
well give way in the face of the rule which requires the capitalization of the cost
26
of capital assets.
It remanded for further consideration whether the disbursements should
be treated as "anticipatory withdrawals of future earnings," its characterization of the Tax Court's initial approach, or as capital expenditures:
If [the salaries] be anticipatory withdrawals of future earnings, the partners
will be entitled to exclusions from income, deductions or credits in future years
if the partnership has earnings, or if they repay the bank loan. On the other
hand, if the disbursements be treated as part of the cost of capital assets, the
partnership, until August 31, 1952, and the corporation thereafter, will be en27
titled to additional depreciation allowances.

24

1d. at 1209.
25281 F.2d at 236.

26

1d.

27

1d. at 237.
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No further opinion issued after remand, and the question went unanswered, perhaps because the 1954 Code had intervened to answer a great
many questions about partners' salaries.
In summary, prior to the 1954 Code the treatment of salary and interest payments to partners was complicated and unclear. Too little was explained by the basic rule that such payments constituted distributions of
partnership profits not deductible in the computation of partnership taxable income or loss. Because Lloyd and the General Counsel's Memorandum
that purported to follow it- permitted some partners to trace their salaries
to returns of their own capital and others to trace their capital to salaries
expensed to their fellow partners, it was assumed that salaries could also be
traced to tax-exempt or preferred income and treated accordingly. 29 Complications other than computational arose from the development of limitations on the Lloyd tracing approach. One was the principle that a transaction between partnership and partner will be treated as a transaction with a
third party if it is entered into by a partner other than in his capacity as a
partner. This argument was occasionally successful,3 although it was never
very clear when it would be invoked by the Service and the courts. Another
limitation on Lloyd was the principle that charges against capital accounts
can be scrutinized on a case-by-case basis to see if they represent sufficiently
current and substantial economic outlays to support deductions or exclusions. 3 ' Another limitation was the notion that partnership doctrine cannot
be used to deduct outlays of a capital nature. 32 The development of each of
'5 G.C.M.6582, VIII-2 C.B. 200 (1929), declaredobsolete, Rev. Rul. 69-31, 1969-1 C.B. 307.
29Supra note 17.
1n Shirley v. O'Malley, 91 F. Supp. 98 (D.Neb. 1950), a partnership was held entitled to
deduct rental paid to its two members of equipment rented from them. In H.H. Wegener, 41
B.T.A. 857 (1940), affd, 119 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1941), one of three equal joint venturers was
held taxable on the entire amount of net compensation he received from his joint venture for
drilling oil wells. His argument that one-third of the amount should be treated as a return of
his own capital was rejected because he drilled for his partnership "as any outsider might have
done," 119 F.2d at 51. See also LeifJ. Sverdrup, 14 T.C. 859, 866 (1950); Harvey M. Toy, 1942
T.C.M. (P-H) 42,542.
3
n George D. Rosenbaum, 16 T.C. 664 (1951), affd on reh., 18 T.C. 35 (1952), general
partners were not permitted to deduct the amounts by which their capital accounts had been
charged as the result of a compromise of an internal partnership dispute:
[T]he compromise did not entail a liquidation of the partnership or the disposition of the
interest of any partner. It was a capital transaction and its net effect was to enlarge the
partnership interests of the senior partners and to reduce the partnership interests of the
junior partners.
16 T.C. at 670. For a case in which partners were held to realize income because of increases in
their capital accounts from transfers from the capital accounts of their fellow partners, see
Harry
W. Lehman, 19 T.C. 659 (1953).
32
1n addition to Stout, see H. H. Wegener, supra note 30, in which a joint venturer was not
permitted to treat a portion of his payment for drilling oil wells for the joint venture as a return of his own capital:
The $130,594.50 which was paid to petitioner by [the joint venture of which he was onethird owner] was merely changed from capital assets in cash to capital assets consisting of
oil wells, in which petitioner retained the same undivided interest he had in the cash. He
can not, therefore, be said to have subtracted from the newly acquired assets a part of his
capital investment therein and at the same time continue to hold an equal interest with his
coadventurers in the property. He cannot retain his capital in the joint venture and withdraw it too.
41 B.T.A. at 862. See also George D. Rosenbaum, supranote 31.
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these notions can be viewed as part of a gradual shift toward the entity approach with respect to salary and interest payments to partners.33 The shift
is highlighted by the statements in Stout that partners' salaries are ordinary
income under basic principles governing compensation rather than under
partnership doctrine. While the shift was still equivocal in the courts it was
mandated by the Congress in the 1954 Code even more clearly than it had
been decades earlier in the Uniform Partnership Act.

III. THE 1954 CODE
The House and Senate Reports introduce the partnership provisions
of the 1954 Code with a statement in the nature of a declaration of war
against the confusion that had dominated the partnership area:
The existing tax treatment of partners and partnerships is among the most
confused in the entire income tax field. The present statutory provisions are
wholly inadequate. The published regulations, rulings, and court decisions are
incomplete and frequently contradictory. As a result partners today cannot
form, operate,
or dissolve a partnership with any assurance as to tax conse34
quences.
The confusion was said to be particularly unfortunate because of the great
number of businesses, particularly small businesses and farming operations, conducted in the partnership form. Accordingly, "simplicity, flexibility, and equity as between the partners" were the principle objectives of the
first comprehensive statutory treatment of partners and partnerships.
Congress sought to simplify the area of partnership payments to partners by providing a "statutory pattern" for transactions between a partner
and his partnership:
SEC. 707 TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN PARTNER AND PARTNERSHIP.
(a) Partner Not Acting in Capacity as Partner. - If a partner engages in a
transaction with a partnership other than in his capacity as a member of such
partnership, the transaction shall, except as otherwise provided in this section,
be considered as occurring between the partnership and one who is not a
partner.
(c) Guaranteed Payments. -To the extent determined without regard to
the income of the partnership, payments to a partner for services or the use of
capital shall be considered as made to one who is not a member of the partner:3See, e.g., Shirley v. O'Malley, 91 F. Supp. 100 (D. Neb. 1950):
It is true.., that if the partnership is under a binding liability to one of the partners for
the expense, that it should be allowed as a partnership deduction.
It is not necessary for the decision in this case to distinguish between the "aggregate"
and "entity" theory of partnerships. The hybrid nature of any partnership makes it necessary in certain instances to recognize it as a unit separate and distinct from its members.
• . . It is clear that it would be stretching the "aggregate" theory of partnerships to hold
that under the conditions of this case the plaintiff was merely renting equipment to himself. Especially in view of the fact that he would be liable for one-half of any loss occasioned by the equipment rentals, but would not be entitled to one-half of the rentals paid
by the partnership since he did not own nor rent one-half of the equipment to the partnership.
34
H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1954) [hereinafter "HousE REPORT"]; S.
REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1954) [hereinafter "SENATE REPORT"].
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ship, but only for the purposes of section 61(a) (relating to gross income) and,
subject to section 263,for purposes of section 162(a) (relating to trade or business

expenses).
Subsection (b), not reproduced above, is an exception to the general rule of
subsection (a) that disallows losses and taxes gain as ordinary income in the
case of certain sales or exchanges with a controlled partnership. The italicized portion of subsection (c) was added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 to
make clear that otherwise capital expenditures are not made currently
35
deductible by section 707.
A. Section 707(a)
Section 707(a) provides the general rule that when a partner engages
in a transaction with his partnership other than in his capacity as a partner,
the transaction shall be treated as occurring between the partnership and a
non-partner. We have seen that such a principle was occasionally applied
by the courts prior to the 1954 Code.3 6 The question is, therefore, whether
subsection (a) was intended merely to approve of the holdings of these relatively isolated cases, or whether it was intended to render the principle
more generally applicable.
It is clear that Congress intended to treat a wide range of transactions
between partnership and partner as occurring between unrelated third
parties. In general, with respect to sales of property and the rendition of
services, the House and Senate Reports declare unequivocal Congressional
intent to adopt an entity approach "because of its simplicity of operation
.... ,,37
With respect to partnership payments to partners of salary and
interest in particular, the Senate Report's general explanation of provisions
states:
The payment of a salary by the partnership to a partner for services again
raises the problem as to whether the partnership is to be viewed as an entity or
merely as an aggregate of the activities of the members. Under present law,
fixed payments to a partner are not recognized as salary but considered as a

distributive share of partnership earnings. This creates obvious difficulties
where the partnership earnings are insufficient to meet the salary. The existing
approach has been to treat the fixed salary in such years as a withdrawal of capital, taxable to the extent that the withdrawal is made from the capital of other
partners. Such treatment is unrealisticand unnecessarily complicated. The House bill
provides that payment of a fixed or guaranteed amount for services is to be
treated as salary income to the recipient and allowed as a business deduction 38
to
the partnership. [Y]our committee. . . extends the rule to interest payments.
Note that the application of the entity approach to salaries and interest, can
be to the disadvantage of the recipient: although the entire payment is
35

The same result has been reached under 707(c) as it stood prior to the passage of the
1976 Act.Jackson E. Cagle,Jr., 63 T.C. 86 (1974), affid, 539 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976); Rev. Rul.
75-214, 1975-1 CuM. BULL. 185. A related change, albeit one that does more than reiterate
existing law, is effected by 1976 Act § 213 (b) (1), which adds section 709 to subchapter K to
govern the treatment of partnership organization and syndication fees.
36Supra note 30.
3
38

HOUSE REPORTat 67;

SENATE

SENATE REPORTat 92.

REPoRT at 92.
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deducted in the computation of partnership taxable income or loss, it must
be included in the ordinary income of the recipient. The entity approach,
for example, prevents a partner from relying on Lloyd to claim that a portion of his salary should not be taxed as ordinary income because it represents a return of his own capital or is traceable to tax-exempt interest income.
What is not clear is the extent to which entity treatment of salaries and
interest is required by section 707(a), the extent to which it is required by
section 707(c), and the extent to which, if at all, the aggregate approach
continues to apply. It is not clear, for example, whether the general explanation just quoted slurs together discussion of 707(a) and 707(c), or whether it ignores section 707(a) completely. The legislative history of section 707
almost completely ignores subsection (a). The entire "detailed discussion"
of 707(a) is as follows:
Subsection (a) provides the general rule that a partner who engages in a
transaction with the partnership, other than in his capacity as a partner, shall
be treated as though he were an outsider. Such transactions include the sale of
property by the partner to the partnership, the purchase of property by the
partner from the partnership, and the rendering of services by the partner to
the partnership or by the partnership to the partner. Transactions involving
contributions of money or property to the partnership by the partner, or distributions of money or property by the partnership to the partner are not governed by this section.39
The Regulations add that 707(a) transactions
include loans of money or
40
property between partnership and partner.
The Regulations suggest that 707(a) mandates entity treatment of
transactions that are within the normal activity of partnership and partner:
Where a partner retains the ownership of property but allows the partnershipto
use such separately owned property for partnershippurposes (for example, to obtain credit or to secure firm creditors by guaranty, pledge, or other agreement)
the transaction is treated as one
between a partnership and a partner not acting
41
in his capacity as a partner.

The transaction described is within the normal activity of the partnership
insofar as it is specified to be in pursuance of partnership purposes. It is
within the normal function of a partner because partners frequently loan
property to their partnerships for partnership purposes to protect their
partnership interests or to satisfy a perceived obligation to the partnership.
Indeed, if the words "allow the partnership to use" have their ordinary
connotation, the transaction would rarely be undertaken with a non-partner because no payment is made for the use of the property. The use of the
words "the transaction is treated as one [with] a partner not acting in his capacity as a partner" also indicate that section 707(a) was intended to mandate entity treatment of transactions that fall within the normal interaction
between partner and partnership.
"Senate Report at 386. The language of the House Report is identical except insofar as it

refers to the rendering of services "for pay" by the partner to the partnership. HOUSE REPORT
at A226.
40
Freas. Reg. § 1.707-1(a) (1960).
41
1d. (emphasis added)
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The origin of 707(a) also indicates that it was originally intended to
mandate entity treatment of salary payments to partners. Section 707(a) is
based on virtually identical proposals of the American Law Institute and
the American Bar Association:
[I]f a partner. . . receives payments from the partnership in exchange for services rendered by him to the partnership, or otherwise engages in a transaction
with the partnership wherein he is not acting in his capacity as a partner, the
transaction shall42be treated as occurring between the partnership and one who
is not a partner.
Both the American Law Institute 3 and American Bar Association 44 explanations state a clear intent to achieve simplicity by adopting an entity approach to the treatment of salaries to partners.
An intent to mandate entity treatment of salaries would explain why
neither the legislative history nor the Regulations attempt to distinguish
between transactions that are in a capacity as a partner and those that are
not. The legislative history states only that 707(a) is not intended to apply to
contributions or distributions. The Regulations add nothing more than the
following two sentences, which constitute the only portion of the Regulations to deny 707(a) treatment:
However, transfers of money or property by a partner to a partnership as contributions, or transfers of money or property by a partnership to a partner as
distributions, are not transactions included within the provisions of this section.
In all cases, the substance of the transaction will govern rather than its form.
See paragraph (c) (3) of § 1.731-1.45
The reference to § 1.731-1(c)(3) offers no guidance on this point. That
Regulation simply provides that "turnaround" contributions and distributions may be treated as exchanges. 46 Thus, for example, if property is "contributed" by one partner and immediately "distributed" to another partner,
an exchange of property between the two partners may be deemed to have
taken place.
Section 707(a) as finally passed differs from its ALI and ABA origins in
two important respects. First, its basic structure is different. The ALI and
ABA drafts specifically refer to payments to a partner for services, after
which they refer generally to transactions in which a partner is "otherwise"
not acting in his capacity as a partner. The removal of the specific reference
to services followed by "or otherwise" leaves 707(a) susceptible to a literal
interpretation that the only services covered are those performed by a part42

American Law Institute, Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Tax Project, Section X755(a)

(January 1954 Draft). The entire Draft of the proposed subchapter on Partnerships and Partners is reproduced as Appendix A ofJackson et al., A Proposed Revision of the Federal Income Tax
Treatment of Partnershipsand Partners-AmericanLaw Institute Draft, 9 TAX L. REv. 109. 170-189
(1954). The proposal of the American Bar Association was virtually identical. See Appendix to
the Statement on Behalf of the American Bar Association by Mark H. Johnson, Esq., Forty
Topics Relating to the General Revision oj the Internal Revenue Code: HearingsBefore the House Committee43on Ways and Means, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. 1371, 1374 (1953).
Jackson et al.,supra note 42 at 138-39.
44
Forty Topics, supra note 42, at 1380- 81.
45
Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1 (a) (1960).
46
Treas. Reg. § 1.731 - 1(c) (3) (1960).
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ner "other than in his capacity" as a partner. Second, section 707(a) was
finally enacted in tandem with 707(c), which has no counterpart in the ALI
or ABA proposals. Section 707(c)*s specific reference to services made it
inevitable that it47would be difficult to define the respective applications of
the two sections.

B. Section 707(c)
Section 707(c) embraces fewer types of transactions than 707(a). It
does not embrace any payments running from partner to partnership, nor
does it govern sales of property. It includes only payments by a partnership
to a partner for services or for the use of capital, and only if those payments
are determined without regard to partnership income. Guaranteed payments under 707(c) are included in the ordinary income of the recipient
and deducted in the computation of partnership taxable income or loss
provided they are not capital in nature. 48 Unlike 707(a), which treats the
transactions it covers as third party transactions for all purposes, 707(c)
treats the payments it covers as third party payments only for the purposes
of sections 61(a) and 162(a). 49 As a consequence, a guaranteed payment is
not considered an interest in partnership profits to limit the partnership's
choice of taxable year, to determine whether losses will be disallowed on
sales or exchanges, or to determine whether there has been an automatic
termination of the partnership for tax purposes. 50 For the purposes of
other provisions of the Code, "guaranteed payments are regarded as a
partner's distributive share of ordinary income." 5'
Section 707(c) was added in the House out of fear that partnerships
would be given excessive discretion to time the reporting of income if all
salaries paid to their members were treated as paid to third parties. The
fear appeared to be that salaries would be increased or decreased to suit the
occasion. The House Report treats only "guaranteed salaries" as third party salaries:
A partner who renders services to the partnership for a fixed salary, payable
without regard to partnership income, shall be treated to the extent of such
amount like any other employee who is not a partner, and the partnership shall
be allowed a deduction for salary expense. The amount of such salary shall be
included in the partner's gross income,
and shall not be considered a distribu52
tive share of partnership income.
The American Bar Association Tax Section asked the Senate to reconsider
the "without regard to income" language:
The restriction . . . is unnecessary to prevent tax avoidance, and is unrealistic considering the extent to which compensation is customarily tied with
profits of the business. The Commissioner . . . and the courts can adequately
protect the interest of the revenue in the extremely few cases where the Trea47

A. ARONSOHN, PARTNERSHIPS 14, n. 65 (1957).

48

4

Text accompanying note 35, supra.

The scope of the cross-reference to sections 61 and 162 has been the subject of litigation.
See I A. WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 214-17 (2d ed. 1976).
5°Treas. Reg. § 1,707-1(c) (1960).
51

/d.
2
' HousE RePORTat

A226-27.
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income from one
sury will be unfairly deprived of tax through transferring
53
year to another by the employment of artificial salary.

The Senate amended 707(c) to include payments for capital, and directed
in its Report that the timing of the inclusion of guaranteed payments would
differ from the timing of payments from third parties:
The House provisions were amended by your committee to accord the
same treatment as that provided in the case of guaranteed salaries to payments
for the use of capital, to the extent the payments are determined without regard to partnership income. It should be noted that such payments, whether
for services or for the use of capital, will be includible in the recipient's return
the partnership year in which the
for the taxable year with or within which
54
payment was made, or accrued, ends.

Neither the House nor Senate Report gives any further guidance as to
the meaning of the "without regard to income" limitation. Each uses the
terms "guaranteed payments," "fixed salary," and "minimum annual
amount." The House Report states that a partner who is guaranteed a minimum annual amount for his services "shall be treated as receiving a salary
in that amount,"5 5 and the Senate provides he shall be treated as receiving
"a fixed payment in that amount. '56 Neither Report makes any express
mention of salaries determined on the basis of a percentage of gross receipts or net profits. The Staff of the Joint Committee, however, explained
as follows:
Where a minimum payment is guaranteed but the maximum depends on the net
earningsof the partnership, it will be necessary to examine the intent of the partners
53
American Bar Association, Section of Taxation, Supplemental Statement Filed with the
Senate Finance Committee in Connection with Hearings on H.R. 8300, Hearingson H.R. 8300
Before
the Senate Committee on Finance, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 343, 467 (1954).
54
SENATE REPORT at 387.
55
H OUSE REPORT at A227.
56
SENATE REPORT at 387. This statement is significant because it suggests a different result
than that adopted in Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(c) (1960):
Example (2). Partner C in the CD partnership is to receive 30 percent of partnership
income as determined before taking into account any guaranteed payments, but not less
than $10,000. The income of the partnership is $60,000, and C is entitled to $18,000 (30
percent of $60,000) as his distributive share. No part of this amount is a guaranteed payment.
The language from the Senate Report would appear to require that the entire $10,000 in this
example be considered a guaranteed payment. The approach taken by the Regulations, on the
other hand, provides that guaranteed payment treatment shall only be accorded to the difference between the partner's minimum guarantee and his distributive share of partnership income before taking into account the guaranteed payment:
[I]f the partnership had income of $20,000 instead of $60,000, $6,000 (30 percent of
$20,000) would be partner C's distributive share, and the remaining $4,000 payable to C
would be a guaranteed payment.
Thus, ironically, the Regulations require a consideration of the amount of partnership income
in order to determine the existence and size of the guaranteed payment, that is, the amount
supposedly determined without regard to income. Rev. Rul. 66-95, 1966-1 CUM. BULL. 169,
which concerned a guaranteed minimum return on capital contributions to a limited partnership, rejected an attempt to draft around the Regulations:
The fact that a partnership agreement provides that, in the event a minimum payment
must be made to certain partners, the payment shall in all respects be treated as if it were
an expense of the partnership, does not control as to whether the entire minimum
amount will be considered an expense for Federal income tax purposes.
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in determining whether or not payments made under such an arrangement constitute salary . . . .[E]ven when such income is to be treated as57a salary it is to be
reported [at the same time as a distributive share of income].
This language is support for the proposition that payments based on gross
receipts or net earnings may qualify for entity treatment under 707(c).
That is, the inquiry into intent is to determine whether the payments represent an irrevocable obligation of the partnership rather than a withdrawal
by the recipient of an anticipated share of future earnings or a loan to him
from the partnership. The payments would be without regard to income if
they were irrevocable and did not serve to reduce the recipient's share in
future earnings or liquidation proceeds.5 8 On the other hand, the payments would be with regard to income if they were treated as a partner's
drawing charged against his capital account to reduce his share in partnership earnings or assets or represent a debt to the partnership. Thus, for
example, a salary based on a percentage of gross receipts is made without
regard to the income of the partnership if it is made independent of the
profitability of operations and is not chargeable against the recipient's in59
terest.
In conclusion, the legislative history is ambiguous with respect to
whether 707(c) payments must be of predetermined dollar amounts. There
are several reasons why it would be appropriate to interpret 707(c) to include binding partnership obligations to.make percentage payment salaries
that are not charged against the interest of the salaried partner. The first is
that Congress showed a clear intent to avoid the "unrealistic and unneces57

Staff of theJoint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Summary of the New Provi-

sions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 91 (1955) [hereinafter "Staff Report"] (emphasis
added).
58
See the Service's argument before the Tax Court in Pratt, text accompanying notes 8386, infra, that a binding payment of a percentage of gross receipts is not a drawing but a 707(c)
guaranteed payment. In short, its position was
that the purpose of Code § 707(c) is to distinguish between those payments that are actually part of a partner's distributive share and those payments that had no relation to the
profit or loss of the partnership.
Note 85, infra. Compare the 1939 Code case of James L. Ruane, Sr., 17 T.C.M. (CCH) 865, 872
(1958) (citations omitted):
It is well settled .. .that, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a partner is
not entitled to compensation for services rendered a partnership beyond his share of
partnership profits. Therefore, withdrawals made by a partner, whether termed salary or
not, in excess of his distributive share of partnership profits would be chargeable against
his capital account, unless otherwise agreed to by the partners. Especially would that be
true where, as here, those withdrawals exceeded partnership profits for the year. It was
necessary that petitioners show that the payments received by Ross represented guaranteed payments of salary which the other members of the firm had agreed were to be
treated as a business expense in the determination of partnership profits and losses.
5
Compare, e.g., the 1939 Code case of Shirley v. O'Malley, 91 F. Supp. 100(D. Neb. 1950), in
which the court permitted the partnership to deduct rental payments made to its two members even though the allocation of the profits remaining after the rent was paid was based on
the amount of rent paid to each partner:
We can only point out that the rental payments were in no way tied up or contingent upon
the partnership profits in this case. It is true that the distribution of the profits was contingent upon the rental payments, but the converse obviously does not follow. The uncontradicted testimony of the partners was to the effect that the rental payments had to be
made even if a loss resulted and the loss was to be shared equally.
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sarily complicated" prior law and adopt, for the sake of simplicity, an entity
approach to salaries paid to partners. The second is that the focus of legislative attention was on 707(c), rather than on 707(a), as the vehicle for requiring entity treatment. The third is that the simplicity achieved will cost
little, if anything. Discussion of the adoption of the entity approach generally concluded that, apart from the matter of timing, there would be little
difference in most cases in the result under the entity or aggregate approach. 60 The House fear of unbridled discretion to time income appears
to be met by the Senate Report directive that guaranteed payments must be
reported at the same time as distributive shares and as soon as paid or accrued by the partnership.

IV. THE PRATT CASE
A. The Facts
The taxpayers in Edward T. Pratt61 were the three general partners of
two limited partnerships that had each been formed to purchase, develop
and operate a particular shopping center. The three owned a combined 44
percent share of one partnership and a 27 percent share of the other. Each
of them and both partnerships reported income on the basis of the calendar year. However, the partners were cash method taxpayers whereas their
partnerships reported according to an accrual method. At issue was the
proper treatment of amounts credited on the partnership books to accounts payable to the three general partners (a) for managing the partnership and (b) as interest on notes issued to them by the partnership.
The partnership agreements provided as follows with respect to the
management fees at issue:
Such General Partners shall contribute their time and managerial abilities to
this partnership, and each such General Partner shall expend his best effort to
the management of and for the purpose for which this partnership was
formed. That for such managerial services and abilities contributed by the said
General Partners, they shall receive a fee of five (5%) percent of the Gross Base
Lease Rentals of the said leases, and then the said General Partners shall receive (10%) percent of all overrides and/or percentage rentals provided for in
said leases as a fee for such managerial services.
The General Partners shall give their personal services to the Partnership
and shall devote thereto such time as they may deem necessary, without compensation other than the managerial fees are hereinbefore set out. Any of the
Partners, General or Limited, may engage in other business ventures of every
nature and description, independently or with others ....62
60

See A Proposed Revision, supra note 42 at 138; Jackson et at., The Internal Revenue Code of
1954: Partnerships,54 COLUM. L. REV. 1183, 1200 (1954); Statement of Mark H. Johnson,
Esq., supra note 42 at 1383. Currently, elaborate allocation mechanisms are frequently used to
separate tax benefits from cash benefits and allocate them differently. See generally Weidner,
Partnership
Allocations and Tax Reform, 5 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1, 37-45 (1977).
61
Supra note 3.
6264 T.C. 205 (1975).
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The management fee thus assigned to the general partners as a class was
allocated equally among the three. It was stipulated that the fees were
reasonable and proper and that a like amount would have had to have been
paid to an unrelated third party to manage the shopping centers. For each
of the years in question, the fees were credited to accounts payable to the
general partners and accrued and deducted by the partnerships in the
computation of partnership taxable income or loss. The fees, however,
were neither paid nor reported by the general partners during any of the
years in question. Their position was that they, as cash method taxpayers,
need not include the fees in income until actually received.
Each partnership also issued a note to the general partners in return
for a loan. They agreed to repay principal plus "interest at the rate of 6
percent of the principal per annum without regard to the partnership receipts or income." 63 Little else is clear about the loans other than that they
took place shortly after partnership formation and that the amounts of interest accured were significant. Indeed, with respect to one of the partnerships, the annual interest accrued was from 31 to 52 percent greater than
the management fees. The strategy with respect to the interest was the
same as with the management fees. The interest was credited to accounts
payable to the general partners and was accrued and deducted in the computation of partnership taxable income or loss. The interest payments were
neither made to the general partners nor reported by them in any of the
years in question.
B. The Peculiar Posture of Pratt
Pratt involved the least sympathetic situation for treating payments to
partners as deductible expenses of the partnership. The general partners
attempted to have their cake and eat it too-share today in deductions for
items accrued but unpaid by their partnerships and at the same time don
the hat of cash method taxpayers to postpone indefinitely tax liability for
the credits that generated the deductions. In short, the gravamen of Pratt
was the tax advantage being taken of the differential in accounting
methods of partnership and partner. The Service did not challenge the
arrangement on the ground that the credits to the accounts payable to the
general partners were never intended to have economic effect. It had been
stipulated:
Petitioners could have legally caused the two partnerships to pay the management fees and interest to them had they chosen to do so.
It was the intent of all the partners in [each partnership] that the manage64
ment fees and interest were to be expenses to the partnerships.
Nor did the Service argue that the general partners were in constructive
receipt of the amounts in question, 65 or that the interplay of accounting
methods had resulted in a material distortion of income. 66 Rather, it made
its attack solely within the confines of section 707.
-64 T.C. 206 (1975).
464. T.C 207 (1975).
5See text accompanying note 78, infra.
"Seegenerally CODE §446(b) and Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(b) and (c) (1973).
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In short, the Service sought to make 707 function in the partnership
area in much the way section 267 functions in the corporate area. Section
267 disallows losses on sales or exchanges with a related corporation 67 and
further provides that an accrual method corporation may not deduct trade
or business or interest expenses it accrues to related persons unless they are
actually paid within 2'/2 months after the close of the taxable year of the
accrual. 68 The effect of the latter rule is to deny the deduction entirely. The
general partners emphasized that 267 does not apply to partnerships,
which the Tax Court accepted quite readily. The 267 Regulations,6" however, which were referred to by the Tax Court, direct the reader to section
707 for the rules governing transactions between partner and partnership.
Section 707(b), which deals with sales or exchanges with a controlled partnership, is based on section 267.70 The Tax Court may have assumed that
section 707(a) and 707(c) were intended to treat the problem of different
accounting methods in an analogous way to section 267. The general partners tried to prevent the court from interpreting 707 in such a way by
emphasizing that, if the partnerships had been corporations, the recipi71
ents had an insufficient ownership interest to bring 26-7 into play.
Given that 707 does not contain a specific 267-type provision to limit
the interplay of accounting methods, the Service argued in the alternative
that the payments were not deductible in the computation of partnership
taxable income or loss and that, if they were deductible by the partnership,
they were also includible in the partners' income even though not actually
received. The general partners argued that all the credits were deductible
under 707(a), which, we have seen, has no counterpart to the 707(c) "paid
or accrued" Regulation.
C. The Interest on the Loans
The Tax Court characterized the position of the general partners with
respect to the interest payments as follows:
[The general partners] agree with [the Service] that under section 707(c) the
interest on the notes are guaranteed payments but argue that these amounts
67

§§ 267(a) and 267(b) (2) and (3).
§ 267(a) (2).
6
9'Treas. Reg. § 1.267(b)-1(b)(1)(1960).
70
CODE § 707(b)(3):
(3) Ownership of a capital or profits interest.- For purposes of paragraphs (1) and (2)
of this subsection, the ownership of a capital or profits interest in a partnership shall be
determined in accordance with the rules for constructive ownership of stock provided in
section 267(c) other than paragraph (3) of such section.
7164 T.C. at 208:
Petitioners further argue that even were the provisions of section 267 applicable to partnerships they would not qualify as related taxpayers under the provisions of section 267
since they did not own over a 50 percent interest in either partnersbip. Petitioners suggest
that if we do not accept the position that the partnerships are entitled to deduct the accrued management fees and interest expense and petitioners are not for that reason required to include these amounts in their incomes for the years in which the partnerships
take the deduction, then, rather than including the items in the incomes of each petitioner, the basis of each one's partnership interest should be decreased to the extent of the
accrued fees and interest as provided in section 1.267(b)- I (b) (2), example (1). Income Tax
Regs.
The Tax Court said that the inapplicability of 267 rendered it unnecessary to consider the
Regulationjust cited.
8

CODE

6 CODE
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are includible in their income only when received, and that the regulation making such payments includible in income by partners in the year paid or accrued
'2
by the partnership . . . is "an overextension of [the Service's] authority.
Not surprisingly, the Tax Court relied on the legislative history discussed
7 3
earlier to uphold the "paid or accrued" Regulation. On appeal, the general partners objected strenuously to the Tax Court's assertion that they
had conceded the interest payments were guaranteed payments under
707(c).7 4 They stressed that their primary argument was that the interest
was deductible by the partnership under 707(a), and not under 707(c), and
that their assertion of the invalidity of the 707(c) Regulation was merely a
fall-back position.
The basic position of the partners was that 707(a) covers interest on
loans from partners and that 707(c) embraces only "interest" on their capital contributions:
[T]he use by Congress of the well-defined and commonly understood term
"capital" clearly indicates that . . . 707(c) is applicable only to guaranteed re. . . 707(a) applies to interest paid by a
turns on capital contributions while
75
partnership to a partner on loans.
They stressed that the 707(a) Regulations specifically refer to interest on
loans from partners and that the 707(c) Regulations do not. To treat the
loans in this case as falling outside 707(a) and within 707(c), they argued,
would render the 707(a) Regulations nugatory because if the loans in Pratt
did not qualify under 707(a), none would:
The loan transactions in the instant case were straight loan transactions occurcontemring subsequent to the formation of the partnerships and were neither
76
plated or required by the limited partnership agreement of either.
At the very most, they said, the only loans that would fall within 707(c)
would be those that were required of the partners in the partnership agreement.
In its Brief, the Government joined the taxpayers in their request that
the Tax Court be reversed on the matter of interest payments and that they
be held deductible under section 707(a) rather than under 707(c):
The Commissioner . . . concedes that, since there is no dispute . . . that
taxpayers' loans . . . were bona fide loans (as opposed to, for example, disguised capital contributions), the loan transactions are to be treated
under . . . Section 707(a) and that the interest accrued on such loans therefore does not constitute a "guaranteed payment" under Section 707(c). As a
result, the rules for recognizing income regarding "guaranteed
payments" . . . are inapplicable. Rather, taxpayers, as cash basis taxpayers,
interest payments when they are actually or constructively
must recognize the
77
received by them.

72

64 T.C. 212-13 (1975).
'Text accompanying note 54, supra.
Brief for Appellants at 17-18, Pratt v. Commissioner, 550 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1977)
[hereinafter "Brief for Appellants"].
75Brief for Appellants at 21.
73
74

76ld.

"7Brief for the Appellee at 7-8, Pratt v. Commissioner, 550 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1977)
[hereinafter "Appellee's Brief"].
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In a footnote, the government warned that the doctrine of constructive
receipt of income should prevent the result in the case but would not be
urged for the first time on appeal.7 8 Presumably, future cases involving
707(a) claims for deductions for interest on loans to partners might also be
met with challenges by the Service that the "loans" do not represent genuine indebtedness, that they represent contributions to capital rather than
debt, 9 or that the interest deductions,
under the circumstances, represent
80
a material distortion of income.
D. The Management Fees
The Tax Court characterization of the partners' argument about the
management fees is similar to its characterization of their argument with
respect to the interest payments:
Petitioners contend that the management fees credited to them fall within
the provisions of either 707(a) or 707(c) and under either section are properly
deductible by the partnership but not includable in their 81income for the years
accrued by the partnership and credited to their accounts.
Again, the characterization is somewhat misleading because the partners
sought to have the fees treated under 707(a) in order to avoid the 707(c)
"paid or accrued" Regulations. Although they apparently recognized it was
unlikely that the "paid or accrued" Regulations would be invalidated, they
made no attempt to argue that the payments were deductible in the computation of partnership taxable income
or loss under any other provisions or
2
Regulations than those of 707(a).
The Service argued that the management fees were guaranteed payments even though they were in the form of a percentage of gross receipts.
83
F.A. Falconer,
it said, made clear that the substance of the "without regard
to income" requirement, rather than the form of the payment in question,
controls:
The touchstone for determining "guaranteed payments" is whether they
are payable without regard to partnership income. And, in determining whether in a particular case an amount paid by a partnership to a partner is a "drawing" or a "guaranteed payment," the substance of the transaction, rather than
its form, must govern. These are both factual matters to be judged from all the
circumstances."
Falconerinvolved a member of a two person partnership who claimed that
his salary payments were not guaranteed payments because they were sim-

"'Id. at 8 n. 4.

7
"SeeJoseph W. Hambuechen, 43 T.C. 90, 100-01 (1964).
8

"See generally CODE § 446(b) and Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(b) and (c) (1973).
8164 T.C. 209 (1975).
121d. at 209:
Petitioners point to no provisions of the statute other than sections 707(a) and 707(c)
under which management fees to partners for services to the partnership might be
treated differently than such items were treated under the law prior to the enactment of

the 1954 Code.
40T.C. 1011 (1963).
-40 T.C. 1015 (1963) (citation omitted).
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ply withdrawals. The Tax Court held they were guaranteed payments because they had been treated by the partners as compensation for services,
were subject to change only by mutual agreement, and were treated as
partnership expenses that were to be paid even when the partnership was
unprofitable. Prattinvolved all these factors, said the Service, and the same
result should follow even though the payments were based on gross rent
receipts. The "without regard to income" requirement, it said, refers to net
income, and does not require a predetermined dollar amount:
Code § 707 (c) and the regulations thereunder do not require a fixed

salary . ..
It is submitted that the purpose of Code § 707(c) is to distinguish between

those payments that are actually part of a partner's distributive share and those
payments that have no relation to the profit or loss of the partnership. Thus it

appears that in substance the management fees in question were guaranteed
payments.85
In advocating that salaries in the form of a percentage of gross receipts
constitute guaranteed payments, the Service urged an interpretation adopted by many in the real estate industry. Although 707(c)'s scope has never
been clear, many have assumed that payments based on a percentage of
gross receipts would satisfy the "without regard to income" requirement,
even if payments based on a percentage of net cash flow would not. 86 The
reasoning was that salaries in the form of a percentage of gross receipts are
"guaranteed" because they constitute an enforceable obligation of the partnership independent of its profitability. The Tax Court found
no merit to such a distinction. The amounts of the management fees are based
on a fixed percentage of the partnership's gross rentals which in turn constitute
partnership income. To us it follows that the payments are not determined
without regard to the income of the partnership as required by section 707(c)
87

The Tax Court also rejected the taxpayers' argument that the management fees were deductible by the partnership pursuant to 707(a). It noted
the lack of authority interpreting the "other capacity" requirement88 and,
ironically, turned for guidance to 1939 Code cases that had been cited by
the commentators as part of the confusion that gave rise to the need for

85Brief for Respondent at 22-24. Edward T. Pratt, 64 T.C. 203 (1975).
6
See, e.g., Sexton and Charyk, Does the Recent Pratt Case Provide A Method of Insuring Guaranteed Payment Deductions?,43 J. TAX. 66 (1975). But see I A. WILLIS, supra note 49 at 214:
The present statute makes no change with respect to salaries or interest paid to a partner, if based on partnership income. As under prior law, such amounts are restored to
partnership income and are reflected through adjustments to that partner's distributive
share of taxable income. This treatment presumably would be applied regardless of
whether the salary or interest is a percentage of net income or gross income. Compensation contingent on sales is a debatable point. Technically speaking, it is "determined
without regard to the income of the partnership." On the other hand, its character is
contingent, unlike the payment of fixed dollar amounts that were contemplated by the
draftsmen as "guaranteed payments."
1164 T.C. at 210 (1975).
8864 T.C. 211 (1975).
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section 707.89 Its review of the 1939 Code cases moved the court to disqualify the fees from 707(a) because they had been paid to partners "for performing services within the normal scope of their duties as general partners and pursuant to the partnership agreement." 9 It raised, but did not
decide, whether payments for the continuing services of a partner could
ever be included in 707(a).
E. The Fifth Circuit
Because the taxpayers and the government joined in a request that the
Tax Court be reversed on its treatment of the interest payments, 1 the Fifth
Circuit dealt only with the management fees. It said that the "sole issue" on
appeal was
the correctness of the Tax Court's decision that the management fees payable
to the . . . general partners . . . were includable in their income as part of

their distributive share of partnership profits, or, in the alternative, as a "guaranteed payment" under § 707(c) .... 92
This is a rather surprising statement in light of the Tax Court's opinion
that 707(c) is inapplicable because the management fees were based on
income. 93 The court's language was taken virtually verbatim from the
Commissioner's Statement of the Issue on Appeal. 94 However, the Commissioner's Brief itself recognized that the Tax Court had said that the
management fees did not qualify under 707(c). Indeed, the Service
changed its position on appeal and argued that the Tax Court had correctly rejected its argument below that 707(c) applied. It said the Tax Court
"correctly decided that the managerial fees involved herein could not be
treated as guaranteed payments under Section 707(c) since they were, in
fact, dependent on the amount of rental income received by the partnership."95 In short, no one argued 707(c) before the Fifth Circuit; the sole
question became whether the partnership could deduct the fees under
707(a).
As was the case at the Tax Court level, the Fifth Circuit was struck by
the results of the interplay in accounting methods:
The fact that the differing methods of reporting income by the partnership . . . and by the taxpayers . . . resulted in somewhat of an anomaly

does not of itself, of course, require a holding in favor of the Government
... . The fact, however, that the tax returns of the individual taxpayer
partners claimed advantages of losses which, in an economic sense did not

8964 T.C. 212 (1975). The Tax Court cited Svedrup and Wegener, supra note 30, which
were, in testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means, cited as inconsistent with
other decisions. Forty Topics, supra note 42 at 1382. See also A ProposedRevision, supra note 42 at
137 n. 38; Partnerships,supra note 60 at 1200 n. 41; Crampton, Partner-PartnershipTransactions, 1957 N.Y.U. 15th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 71,73 n. 7.
9064 T.C. at 212 (1975).
91Text accompanying notes 76-78, supra.
"Pratt v. Commissioner, 550 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1977).
3IText accompanying notes 86-7, supra.
9Appellee's Brief at 1.
951d. at 19.
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truly exist, may explain the reason why the Commissioner considered it necessary to raise the issue.
The question thus posed is whether the "transaction" encompassed by the
partnership contract providing for the five per cent fees to the partners for
their management services is a "transaction" which is carried out "other than in
his capacity as a member of such partnership."''
By enclosing the word "transaction" with quotation marks, the Fifth Circuit
echoed the Tax Court's dictum that the word "transaction" might not include continuing payments for services. 97 It did not decide the matter, because it held that the "plain meaning" of 707(a)'s "other capacity" requirement had been violated:
It is perfectly clear that the contract creating the partnership, which provided for the percentage payments to the general partners for their management efforts was made with them qua partners. Furthermore, it is equally clear
that the duties to be performed were activities for which the partnership was
created in the first place, i.e., the management of the shopping centers. 9
These two sentences raise two very different points. The first reflects the
Tax Court's emphasis on the fact that the partnership agreement had
mandated the services and fees. This interpretation leaves open the possibility that salaries for partners could qualify under 707(a) if they were provided for in a separate contract rather than in the partnership agreement.
Although this approach sounds somewhat mechanical, it does reflect the
approach taken in some of the pre- 1954 Code cases Pratt apparently resurrects.99 The second sentence, however, suggests that the relation to partnership purpose is what is critical. So, too, does the following language:
• ..Congress determined that in order for the partnership to deal with one of
its partners as an "outsider" the transaction dealt with must be something outside the scope of the partnership.
The particular provision relied on by the taxpayers here simply does not permit a partnership to treat as a deduction for ordinary and necessary business
expenses amounts paid to partners, as° partners, for the performance of services for which the partnership exists.?
The rule that 707(a) only embraces transactions outside the scope of the
partnership is unsupported by the legislative history and is in conflict with
the 707(a) Regulations that specifically embrace a transaction with a partner in pursuance of partnership purposes. 0 1m It is also inconsistent with the
treatment of the Pratt loans as within 707(a). Nowhere was it suggested that
the loans were outside the scope of the partnership business. Not only does
9Pratt v. Commissioner, 550 F.2d 1025-26 (5th Cir. 1977).
sr17ext accompanying note 90, supra.
98
Pratt v. Commissioner, 550 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1977).
99
See, e.g., Stout, supra note 18 at 1208:
But here the stipulated facts show that the amounts were paid to [the partners] pursuant
to the provisions of the partnership agreement and not pursuant to a separate contract
for performance of services. Cf. H.H.Wegener [supra,note 30].
1
OPratt v. Commissioner, 550 F.2d 1026-27 (5th Cir. 1977).
t
' Text accompanying note 41, supra.
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Pratt represent an unfortunately restrictive interpretation of sections
707(a) and (c), it relegates the treatment of garden-variety payments based
on a percentage of gross receipts to the "other capacity" requirement of
707(a). The grant of vitality to the "other capacity" concept is unfortunate
because, long before there ever was an income tax, it was considered a task
suitable for only the most skilled of metaphysicians to determine whether
or not a percentage payment is made to a person in the capacity of a partner. The late Mr. Justice Story is irresistible on this point:
The distinction, as thus presented, does certainly wear the appearance of
no small subtlety and refinement, and scarcely meets the mind in a clear and
unambiguous form; for the question must still recur; when may a party properly be said to have "an interest in the profits, as profits?" When also may it
properly be said, that "the interest in the profits is mutual," and
that "each person has a specific interest in the profits, as a principaltrader?"''2

V. BEYOND PRATT
Pratt forces us to consider how non-707 salary payments are to be
treated by partnership and partner. The Tax Court said that aggregate
treatment is "prevailing as under prior law except where the [1954 Code]
provides otherwise.' ' 03 This has led to speculation that Lloyd is still good
law and that other strategies may be adopted to avoid entity treatment
when it is to taxpayer advantage. 10 4 This section of the paper proceeds to
make two, interrelated points. First, Lloyd no longer controls. Second, there
are other provisions of the Code than 707 that mandate entity treatment of
compensation payments to partners, provisions, the Tax Court noted, that
10 5
were not raised in Pratt.

There are two basic reasons why Lloyd is unlikely to control non-707
payments to partners. 10 6 First, pre-1954 Code law had developed to the
point of substantially restricting the Lloyd approach. Most notably, Stout
held that general principles governing compensation, notwithstanding the
partnership doctrine explained in Lloyd, require partners to include salaries
in income. 10 7 Stout expressly limited the Lloyd approach of permitting partners to directly deduct or exclude payments traceable to charges against
02

J. STORY, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 50-51 (1841). Somewhat more recent and to the point is
Cowan, Compensating the Promoter-GeneralPartner, 22d WM.& MARY TAX CONF. 81, 83 n.6
(1977).
'

Several years ago, a subcommittee of the Committee on Partnerships of the New York

State Bar Association's Tax Section, attempted to recommend possible legislation to clarify the definitional problems of § 707. After a full year of discussion among a number of
experienced practitioners, it was not possible to develop a consensus either of what the
law was or of what it should be, and no recommendation emerged. The major conceptual
obstacle was trying to determine when a partner was acting in his capacity as a partner,

either generally or in specific instances.
1-64 T.C. 209 (1975).

1"4See, e.g., Sexton and Charyk, supranote 86.
"'See note 82, supra.
"'See Weiss, PaymentsBetween Partnersand Partnerships,1977-1 N.Y.U. 35TH INST. ON FED.
TAX. 169, 182, for the opinion that "decisions like Lloyd were not intended to survive the 1954
Code."
1'Text accompany note 24 supra.
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their capital accounts: no partner may deduct or exclude charges against
his capital account in excess of the amount of his actual cash contribution.
Stout applied this limitation even though it assumed that the capital accounts in question had economic significance. If anything, the skepticism
about the reality of charges against capital account, particularly in the context of real estate partnerships, has increased in the twenty years since
Lloyd. In Stanley C. Orrisch,10 8 for example, the issue was whether a special
allocation of depreciation to two partners had substantial economic effect.
The taxpayers stressed that the depreciation they had been specially allocated had been charged against their capital account and had resulted in a
negative capital account that was far below that of their fellow partners.
The Tax Court accepted that, under normal accounting principles, the
disparate negative capital account would be treated either as a debt to the
partnership or would be taken into account in the division of partnership
assets on liquidation. However, it found no evidence that the partners intended normal accounting principles to govern the significance of their
capital accounts. No debt was intended and the allocations of economic
benefits and burdens continued unchanged. Accordingly, the charges
against capital account had no economic effect. Finally, the appellate court
in Stout indicated that an aggregate approach could not be relied upon to
permit individual partners to directly deduct what was, in business reality,
a capital expenditure of their partnership.
The second basic reason why Lloyd is unlikely to control non-707 payments lies in the 1954 Code and its legislative history. The legislative history is strident in its denunciation of the Lloyd approach as "unrealistic and
unnecessarily complicated." 10 9 The Service years ago declared obsolete the
General Counsel Memorandum that explained the proper computations to
be performed under the principles outlined in Lloyd. 110 If, as Pratt holds,
the legislative intent to reject Lloyd and apply an entity theory to compensation payments to partners is only partially realized in 707, the question is
whether the realization can be made more complete through other sections. The answer, it is submitted, is yes.
A. Current Distributions
Perhaps the simplest way to begin is to step back and consider the
payment of a "salary, so called" that does not actually represent compensation for services. Consider, for example, partner A who supplies capital,
not services, and has a 10 percent interest in partnership net cash flow,
which amounts in year x to $1,000. The actual payment to A of the $1,000 is
governed by section 731. It provides that no gain or loss is recognized by a
partnership when it makes a current distribution of cash to a partner.' It
also provides that no gain is recognized to the partner who receives the distribution, except to the extent it exceeds his basis in his partnership inter-

1055 T.C. 395(1970), affd per curiam,31 A.F.T.R.2d 73-1069(9th Cir. 1973).

'Text accompanying notes 34-8, supra.
G.C.M. 6582, supranote 28.
"'CODE § 73 1(b).
110
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est. 112 Stated differently, a current distribution of cash to a partner reduces
his basis, but not below zero; 11 3 to the extent it exceeds his basis in his partnership interest it represents capital gain.114 Note that the consequences of
the distribution itself tell us little of the overall tax consequences to partnership and partner. Assume that the partnership has taxable income in year x
that equals net cash flow and that A shares in taxable income in the same
ratio that he shares in net cash flow. A is required to report $1,000 in income in year x whether it is distributed to him or not." 5 His basis in his
partnership interest is increased by the $1,000 of income he reports.11 6 The
actual distribution to him of the $1,000 correspondingly reduces his basis
in his interest, resulting in a wash.
Distributions do not simply wash out previously increased basis if they
differ in amount from taxable income or are allocated differently than taxable income. In real estate partnerships, for example, distributions frequently exceed taxable income because they constitute net cash flow that is
sheltered from tax by depreciation deductions. Assume that the $1,000 distributed to partner A represents his distributive share of net cash flow in
year x. Assume further that A shares in taxable income or loss in the same
ratio that he shares in net cash flow but that depreciation deductions have
resulted in zero taxable income. The only tax consequence to A in year x is
the consequence of the distribution itself: his basis in his partnership interest is lowered, but not below zero; he has capital gain if and to the extent
the distribution exceeds his basis in his partnership interest. It is not uncommon among real estate partnerships for depreciation deductions to be
large enough to result in tax losses passed through to A at the same time as
positive cash flow. In such situations, A's basis in his partnership interest is
lowered by both the cash distribution and his share in tax loss.
Consider if partner A receives his 10 percent interest in exchange for
his personal services to the partnership rather than in exchange for a capital contribution. How, if at all, do partner and partnership treat this 10
percent interest differently than the 10 percent interest given in exchange
for a capital contribution? Two distinctions should be made at the outset of
our consideration of this question. First, the transfer of a fractional interest
must be distinguished from the payments made pursuant to the fractional
interest. Second, transfers for past services must be distinguished from
transfers contingent on the performance of substantial future services.
B. Section 721
Section 721 has traditionally governed the transfer of a fractional interest in a partnership for services. It adopts an entity approach that permits a deduction in the computation of partnership taxable income or loss,
and requires ordinary income treatment to the recipient. The current Section 721 Regulations provide that gain shall be recognized
2

" CODE
3

§ 731(a)(1) and Treas. Reg. § 1.7 31-1(a)( I)(i)(1960).

705(a)(2).
I 4 Treas. Reg. § 1.731 -I (a)(3) (1960).
11
Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a) (1972).
116
CODE § 705(a)(1)(A).
11 CODE §
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[t]o the extent that any of the partners gives up any part of his right to be repaid his contributions (as distinguished from a share in partnership profits) in
favor of another partner as compensation for services ....

The value of an in-

terest in such partnership capital so transferred to a partner as compensation
for services constitutes income to the partner under section 61 .117
The amount of ordinary income to the recipient "is the fair market value of
the interest in capital so transferred ..
118 The partnership is entitled to a
deduction because, to the extent the value of the interest transferred is
"compensation for services rendered to the partnership, it is a guaranteed
payment under section 707(c)."I 19
The rule that the value of an interest in capital transferred for services
is a guaranteed payment under 707(c) was extended to transfers of interests in partnership profits in the now famous case of Sol Diamond.120 Diamond was a mortgage broker who received a partnership interest from one
Kargman as compensation for obtaining 100 percent financing of the purchase price of an office building. Diamond was not obligated to contribute
any money, nor was he obligated to provide any further services. It was
agreed that Kargman would pay all acquisition costs above the amount of
financing, and that Kargman and Diamond would share profits in a 40-60
ratio and "be chargeable with all losses in the same proportions." Net proceeds of any sale of the building were to be divided in the same ratio, after
first being applied to reimburse Kargman for any acquisition expenditures
he incurred. Three weeks after closing the acquisition of the building,
Diamond sold his interest for $40,000 and reported that amount as a shortterm capital gain from the sale of a partnership interest.
The Tax Court could not resist requiring Diamond to treat as ordinary
income the value of the interest he had received for his fully-performed
services as a mortgage broker. Prior to Diamond, the parenthetical in the
721 Regulation excerpted above had been interpreted to mean that the
receipt of an interest in partnership capitalfor services was a taxable event
but that the receipt of an interest in partnership profits was not.' Under
the "no taxable event" interpretation, the recipient obtains a zero basis in
his partnership interest, except to the extent he shares in partnership liabilities, 2 2 must subsequently report as ordinary income his allocable share of
partnership profits, and pays capital gain on the sale of the interest. Because Diamond's interest in sales proceeds was subordinated, he argued
that he had received an interest in profits, not capital, and that the "no taxable event" interpretation should apply. The court assumed it was dealing
with a profits interest and rejected the "no taxable event" interpretation. It
said that the "opaque draftsmanship" in the Regulations was insufficient to
override the general rule that the fair market value of property received
for services must be included in gross income.

ON

117Treas. Rig. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1960).
118
d"
119
Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(2)(i) (1960).
12056 T.C. 530 (1971), affid 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
12
'See generally Cowan, Receipt of a Partnership Interestfor Services, 1974-2 N.Y.U. 32D
FED. TAX. 1501.
22
1 See CODE §§ 752(a) and (c) and the Regulations thereunder.
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The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court, and noted that it was
repudiating "a startling degree of unanimity" among the commentators in
so doing. 123 It then addressed the argument that there will be double taxation if the right to share in future profits and the subsequent receipt of
those profits are both taxed. For example, if a partner must include in ordinary income the fair market value of the right to receive approximately
$1,000 a year for several years in the future, will he again be taxed at ordinary income rates on the $1,000 payments as they are actually received? Or
can the basis obtained by paying tax on the fair market value of the interest
when it is received be amortized as the profits are earned? The court said
that the "absence of a recognized procedure for amortization [did not] 'militate against the treatment of the creation of the profit share as income. "124
Diamond came as a shock to many who had believed, with some good
reason, that the receipt of an interest in partnership profits was not a taxable event. 125 As the shock wore off, however, it was realized that Diamond
might be relied upon to taxpayer advantage. That is, the recipient of a subordinated partnership interest might include the value of the interest in
income when it is received, which presumably would be a low value because
of the subordination, and report any profit on the sale of the interest as
capital gain. However, both Diamond opinions express doubt as to whether
this can be done. The Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit each raised, but
did not decide, whether Diamond would have been prohibited from claiming capital gain treatment if he sold at a profit what they characterized as
the right to receive a future stream of ordinary income. 126
Vestal v. United States127 cast even greater doubt on the extent to which a
taxpayer may report a low market value in the year of receipt based on the
contingent nature of future profits and claim appreciation realized on the
liquidation of the interest as capital gain. Vestal was acquainted with assignees of an oil and gas lease who were attempting to sell limited partnership
interests to raise money to drill wells. He contacted four investors who, in
1962, became limited partners and agreed to pay him a finder's fee. Each
agreed in writing to convey to Vestal one-eighth of the limited partnership
interest acquired upon recovery of investment plus 6 percent interest. Two
years later, the partnership's assets were sold at a substantial profit. The
four investors received their share of the proceeds, deducted the amount
of their investment, plus interest, and paid Vestal one-eighth of the remaining balance, which totalled $139,730. The district court accepted Vestal's argument that the finder's fee agreements gave him an interest in a
capital asset that had a fair market value of $29,375 in 1962 and should
have been reported in that year. Vestal made this argument because the
statute of limitations had run against the government for 1962. The court

123492 F.2d at 289.
24

' 1. at 290-91. Peter P. Risko, 26 T.C. 485 (1956), has been cited as authority for the
proposition that the amount included in income may be amortized when the partnership has a
determinable
life.
125Cowan, supra note 121.
12656 T.C. at 547, n. 16; 492 F.2d at 287, n.3.
127498 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1974), rev'g 73-1 U.S.T.C. 9260 (W.D.Ark. 1973).
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held that Vestal had acquired a basis in his partnership interest of $29,375,
a tax cost basis as if he had properly reported in 1962. It permitted him to
report his 1964 liquidation proceeds in excess of this basis as long-term
capital gain.
The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that the interests obtained by
Vestal in 1962 "were contingent, conditional, and speculative, and as a matter of law, did not constitute income taxable to Vestal in 1962. '121 The court
admitted that his rights had value in 1962, but said that "such recognition
does not support a view that Vestal received income under the federal tax
laws."' 129 The court did not want "compensatory income taxable at ordinary
income rates to be treated as capital appreciation ....
When dealing with a situation such as the present where taxpayer holds an
executory contingent contract payable in the future, the tax laws should not be
construed. . to permit him to establish a basis for those same contract rights
in the absence
of a showing that there was an actual trading or marketing of
130
those rights.
13 1
Vestal is somewhat difficult to reconcile with the rationale of Diamond.
The common ground appears to be hostility to the notion that capital gain
can result from interests received as compensation. In any event, these
cases are substantially tempered by statutory developments, at least if the
proposed section 721 Regulations are followed. They provide that transfers of partnership interests for services made after June 30, 1969 are governed by section 83.132
C. Section 83
Section 83 was passed as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.133 The
proposed 721 Regulations that state that -section 83 controls transfers of
partnership interests came as a surprise because section 83 had been discussed and passed in the context of corporate restricted stock plans. Neither section 83 nor its proposed Regulations makes any reference to transfers of interests in partnerships. Although it is often difficult to determine

128498 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1974).
129498 F.2d 491 (8th Cir. 1974).
130498 F.2d 493-94 (8th Cir. 1974).

' 3'Diamond was not cited to the Vestal court until Vestal's petition for a rehearing, in which
he raised it as authority for the proposition that the value of his interest was income in 1962.
The court denied the petition and said that the effect of its decision was to tax Vestal upon his
acquisition of "the actual joint venture interests" and was consistent with the decision in Diamond that the taxable event was "when the parties actually acquired the building to be held as a
joint venture." 498 F.2d at 496 (order on petition for rehearing).
"3 2 Prop. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1)(i)(1971):
If the partnership interest is transferred afterJune 30, 1969 (except to the extent paragraph (b) of § 1.83-8 applies), then the transfer of such interest in partnership capital
shall be treated as a transfer of property to which section 83 and the regulations thereunder applies.
The Proposed Regulations simply parrot the parenthetical in the original section 721 Regulations that Diamond said was insufficient to support differential treatment of compensation payments of interests in capital versus interests in profits.
"mTax Reform Act of 1969 § 321 (a), Pub. L. 91-172.
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how some of the language of the proposed Regulations
will be applied to
134
partnerships, most of the basic pattern is clear.
Section 83 governs transfers of "property"'135 for services, "whether
such transfer is in respect of past, present, or future services."'1 36 It requires, in the words of the Regulations, that the fair market value of property transferred for services be reported as compensation as soon as the
transfer is "complete." Even if the property transferred has a clear market
value, it need not be reported as compensation until the transfer is complete.13 7 The value reported is the value at the time the transfer becomes
complete. 3 8 The transfer becomes complete as soon as the property becomes free from substantial risk of forfeiture or transferable. 3 9 These two
statutory concepts are interdependent. The recipient's.rights are subject to
a substantial risk of forfeiture "if such person's rights to full enjoyment of
such property are conditioned upon the future performance of substantial
services by any individual.' ' 40 The rights are transferable only if they are
free from substantial risk of forfeiture when they are in the hands of the
transferee.' 4' As soon as the transfer is complete and the interest is reported as compensation, a deduction is authorized "to the person for whom
were performed the services .. ,, 4.. However, if the expenditure is capital,
143
an increase in basis, rather than a deduction, results.
Return, now, to our consideration of partner A who receives a 10 percent interest in a partnership in exchange for his promise to manage the
partnership properties. His interest, whether in his own hands or in the
hands of his transferee, is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture 44 and
therefore also nontransferable because it will be extinguished if the services
are not performed satisfactorily. Accordingly, the transfer is not complete
34

' Thus, for example, the Regulations provide that section 83 controls transfers of property "to an employee or an independent contractor." Prop. Reg. § 1.83-1 (a) (1971). The obvious question is whether a partner is "an employee or an independent contractor" within the
meaning of this Regulation. Prop. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1)(i)(1971) answers this question in the
affirmative. Unfortunately, the Regulations offer no other guidance concerning the applicability of section 83 and its Regulations to partnerships.
'ult would be helpful if the Treasury would clarify how its proposed definition of property applies in the partnership area:
For purposes of section 83 and the regulations thereunder, the term "property" includes both realty and personalty other than money and other than an unfunded and
unsecured promise to pay deferred compensation.
Prop.3 Reg.
§ 1.83-3(e) (1971).
1 6Prop. Reg. § 1.83-3(f) (1971).
3
"'8 Prop. Reg. § 1.83-1(e), Example (1)(197 1).
13ld., Example (2).
39
1 CODE
0

14CODE
41

CODE

42

1 CODE
43

§ 83(a).
§ 83(c)(1).
§ 83(c)(2).
§ 83(h).

1 Prop. Reg. § 1.83-6(a)(1971):
[Nbo deduction is allowed under section 83(h) to the extent that property transferred in
connection with the performance of services constitutes a capital expenditure. In such a
case, the basis of the property to which such capital expenditure relates shall be increased
at the same time and to the same extent as any amount is includible in the employee's
gross income in respect of such transfer.
'See Prop. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(1)(1971) for consideration whether the services are substan-

Winter 1977]

Pratt AND DEDUCTIONS

and A is not yet required to report as compensation the value of his 10 percent interest.
Consider the tax consequences to partner A of his 10 percent interest
prior to the time his transfer is complete. Does A receive any different treatment than that outlined earlier for the partner who acquires his interest for
cash, not services? 145 The answer of the section 83 Regulations is yes:
Until such transfer becomes complete, the transferor shall be regarded as the
owner of such property, and any income from such property received . . . by
the employee or independent contractor constitutes additional compensation
and shall be included in the gross income of such employee or independent
contractor for the taxable year in which such income is received ....146
Thus, A's distributions of net cash flow constitute additional compensation
until he reports the receipt of the 10 percent interest. The Regulations also
seem to prevent A from being treated as a partner until the transfer of the
10 percent interest is complete. If the "transferor," presumably the partnership, "shall be regarded as the owner" of the partnership interest until
the transfer is complete, A is presumably not a partner for tax purposes
until that time. If A is not a partner, he is not entitled to a distributive share
of partnership losses. Conversely, he would not be responsible for any distributive share of partnership income. There does not appear to be any
reason why the Service should insist on a literal application of these Regulations to partnerships. 47 It would presumably have to explain the result if
the interests of all of the partners were conditioned on the performance of
substantial future services. It might also refrain from a literal interpretation to avoid establishing a mechanism that would pass all tax losses from
service partners to high-bracket investor-partners.
A way to avoid the risk that partner A will be treated as a non-partner
under the section 83 Regulations lies in the election offered by section
83(b). The person who receives an incomplete transfer is given the election
to value and report the interest as compensation when the incomplete
transfer is first made. 14 The election must be made within 30 days after the
incomplete transfer is made.'4 9 The advantage of the election is that the
reporting of the interest as compensation is the equivalent of a purchase of
the interest insofar as "any subsequent appreciation in value is not taxable
as compensation."' 150 The disadvantage of the election is that the transferee
51
is not allowed a deduction if the property is subsequently forfeited.
14

Text accompanying notes 111-16, supra.
Prop. Reg. § 1.83-1(a)(2)(1971).
147See Cowan, Receipt of an Interest in PartnershipProfits inConsiderationfor Services: The Diamond Case, 27 TAx L. REV. 161, 209-10 (1972).
146

141CODE
14 9

CODE
15 0
Prop.
51

§ 83(b).
§ 83(b)(2).

Reg. § 1.83-2(a)(197 1).

' CoDE § 83(b)(1). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a)(l 971):

[If the property is later forfeited or sold in an arm's length transaction before the transfer of such property becomes complete, such forfeiture or sale shall be treated as a disposition upon which there is recognized a loss equal to the excess (if any) of(I) The amount that the taxpayer actually paid for such property, over
(2) The amount realized (if any) upon such forfeiture or sale.
If such property is a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer, such loss shall be a capital
loss.
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Thus, if partner A elects to report his contingent 10 percent interest as
compensation when he first receives it, he would appear to be treated as if
he acquired it by purchase. Stated differently, a literal application of the
section 83 election Regulations appears to permit A to treat his interest as
if he had acquired it for cash rather than services. Partner A would thus
presumably be entitled not only to capital gain on sale of his interest and a
pass-through of losses, he would be entitled to treat current cash distributions as any other partner: as payments that serve only to reduce his basis in
his partnership interest. The Service may recoil from the idea that distributions of net cash flow for services are reported as distributions in reduction
of basis rather than as compensation. However, that result flows quite readily not only from the section 83 Regulations, but also from the decision in
Pratt that non-707 salaries are nothing other than normal distributive
shares.
D. The Special Allocation Approach
One final approach to non-707 salaries requires mention because it has
received considerable attention recently. 52 It treats a non-707 percentagebased salary as a special allocation. Under this approach, the payments of a
percentage of gross rentals Prattsays are not deductible under 707(a) or (c)
have the same effect as guaranteed payments. The allocation of a percentage of gross receipts has the same effect as a partnership deduction because
the amount specially allocated is removed from the computation of partnership taxable income or loss and attributed directly to the service partner. It has the same effect as a guaranteed payment to the recipient because
the rental income is ordinary income. Such an allocation, it is argued, cannot be disregarded because it represents
actual dollars and, hence, has the
153
requisite "substantial economic effect."'
Although the special allocation argument as thus initially presented
seems relatively inoffensive becasue it parallels guaranteed payment treatment, it seems vulnerable when applied in other contexts because it proves
too much. Consider, for example, if the special allocation is of a share of
net cash flow rather than of gross receipts. Although the partnership would
not claim a deduction or its equivalent, the recipient would treat the payment as a distribution in reduction of basis rather than as an item of ordinary income. This, it could be argued, is what Pratt apparently mandates
and is the same result as that apparently mandated if the section 83(b) election is made. The Service may object because the results of the special allocation approach in this situation are far preferable to the recipient than
those required by section 707 or section 83. Sections 707(a) and (c) both
require payments to be reported as compensation. Section 83 also requires
the payments to be reported as compensation until the transfer is complete
unless the 83(b) election is made. Note that the special allocation approach
also avoids the problem of treating the service partner as a non-partner
under section 83. In short, the special allocation approach enables partners
' 52Cowan, supra note 102; Weiss, supra note 106.
'53CODE § 704(b)(2).
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to claim the advantages of the classical aggregate approach and trace their
"salaries, so called" to items of tax-exempt or preferred income.
The special allocation approach may also meet resistance because of
the amount of the deduction equivalent it yields. Recall that section 707(c)
has never been available to convert capital expenditures into currently
deductible items. 154 Guaranteed payments are only deductible to the extent
they represent ordinary and necessary business expenses under section
162. Recall, too, that section 83 prohibits deductions for compensation
payments that are not ordinary and necessary. 55 It has already been suggested that the special allocation approach produces the "equivalent of
a deduction" for payments that would not be deductible if made to third
parties:
Allocating an item of income to the general partner removes it from the
computation of partnership taxable income or loss allocable to the other partners; therefore, it has the same "bottom line" impact as a deduction-except
that it need not run the gamut of § 162 as an ordinary and necessary business
expense.156

This approach is similar in effect to the old argument that guaranteed
payments are automatically deductible even though they would not be
deductible if made to third parties.
The question remains whether and how a percentage allocation for
services could be disregarded. It is clear that the "substantial economic
effect" requirement was intended "to prevent the use of special allocations
for tax avoidance purposes .. 1117
5..However, an allocation that is disregarded is normally reallocated. For example, if a 100-0 allocation of the depreciation deduction in an otherwise 50-50 partnership is disregarded, the
deduction will be reallocated on a 50-50 basis. An actual dollar allocation of
a percentage of gross receipts would not be reallocated. It would be the
characterization of the allocation, rather than the allocation itself, that
could be disregarded.
One final argument can be made to qualify percentage salaries as guaranteed payments. The Code provides that the partnership agreement controls allocations that have substantial economic effect. 15s It also defines the
partnership agreement to include any modifications made up until the time
required for the filing of the partnership return. 159 It can be argued that
707(c) applies if the partnership agreement is amended at the end of the
year to restate a percentage-based salary in terms of a fixed dollar amount.
Unlike the special allocation approach, the retroactive allocation approach
does not result in treating salaries as distributions of preferred or exempt
income or in the equivalent of a deduction for expenses that are not ordinary and necessary.

' 54Supra note 35.
""5Supra note 143.
56
'Cowan, supra note 102 at 87.
1 7
5 S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1976).
8
11 CODE §§ 704(a) and (b).
59
' CoDE § 76 1(c).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The partnerships in Prattdeducted amounts they credited to accounts
payable to their members for salaries and interest, even though the accruals were never actually paid. Unfortunately, this unsympathetic case for
the taxpayers was litigated entirely within the confines of 707, rather than
under principles of constructive receipt or material distortion of income.
The result of the litigation, during which the Service changed its position
with respect to the. proper treatment of both interest and management
fees, is restrictive interpretations of 707(a) and 707(c) by the Tax Court,
and a restrictive interpretation of 707(a) by the Fifth Circuit. The opinions
appear to frustrate the intent behind 707 to reject the "unrealistic and
unnecessarily complicated" approach of prior law and adopt, for the sake
of simplicity, an entity approach to payments to partners for services and
capital. In particular, 707(c) was intended to be the primary vehicle for the
application of the entity approach to payments to partners for their services and capital. Although the legislative history is cast primarily in terms
of fixed dollar amounts, legislative intent would appear to be furthered,
not frustrated, if 707(c) were interpreted to include binding obligations to
pay ordinary and necessary compensation in the form of a percentage of
gross or net receipts. Stated differently, the Government's position before
the Tax Court should have been adopted: 707(c) is not confined to predetermined dollar amounts because the "without regard to income" limitation
was intended only to exclude partners' drawings that were conditional or
that served to reduce the recipient's interest in partnership assets or profits.
A great deal of confusion would be avoided if the Service would indicate its disapproval of the reasoning in Pratt.If it does not, it should clarify
how non-707 salaries are to be treated by partner and partnership. The
aggregate approach of Lloyd was denounced by commentators and the
Congress as "unrealistic and unnecessarily complicated." The Service will
probably oppose a revival of the Lloyd approach for the additional reason
that it permits partners to directly deduct charges against their capital accounts. The Service may also oppose the notion that payments based on
gross receipts are special allocations, at least to the extent the argument is
made to achieve the effect of a deduction for compensation payments that
fail to qualify as ordinary and necessary business expenses. The most likely
vehicle for applying an entity approach to non-707 salary payments is section 83, which proposed Regulations say controls transfers of partnership
interests for services. Unfortunately, the section 83 Regulations do not explain their application to partnerships. The Service should make clear how
garden-variety payments based on gross receipts are to be treated. Now,
just as prior to the 1954 Code, the primary goal of all concerned is certainty.

